Abstract: The Liikanen Group proposes contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds as instruments to enhance financial stability in the banking industry. Especially life insurance companies could serve as CoCo bond holders as they are already the largest purchasers of bank bonds in

Europe. The growing number of banks issuing CoCo bonds leads to a rising awareness of these hybrid securities among life insurers as they are increasingly looking for higher-yielding investments into bond-like asset classes during the current low interest rate period. Our contribution provides an insight for life insurance companies to understand the effects of holding CoCo bonds as implied by the Solvency II standards that will become effective by
2016.
The Liikanen Group strongly recommends the issuance of contingent convertible debt by banks as a potential mechanism to reduce the risk shifting towards tax payers created by governments' safety nets as well as to enhance financial stability in the banking sector. This form of long term debt, (also called contingent convertibles or CoCo bonds), with a fixed coupon rate, automatically converts to equity when a bank approaches insolvency, i.e. when a predetermined trigger is met. Upon conversion, a bank immediately replenishes its equity capital base, while at the same time reducing its interest payment obligations. From the internal model, we learn that capital requirements for CoCo bonds increase with increasing trigger value, decreasing conversion ratio as well as increasing bank risk. In addition, CoCos lead to higher capital charges than non-convertible bonds if bank risk is low, and to lower capital requirements if bank risk is high. For low bank risk, an increase in capital requirements for CoCos is accompanied by an increase in the credit spread. For high bank risk, insurers clearly benefit from buying CoCos due to lower capital charges and a higher coupon rate (see Figure 2) . In this case, holding a CoCo clearly dominates holding a nonconvertible bond. Therefore, insurers might even accept a reduction in the fair bond spread due to the reduction of risk capital. As a potential growth area for CoCos from an insurer's point of view, we identify small-sized CoCo bonds from lower than AAA rated counterparties.
Policy Implications
Our results have several economic implications. Policymakers responsible for determining whether particular contingent capital designs will qualify to meet Basel III capital requirements and ultimately add to financial stability get a hint in how far CoCo bonds are an attractive investment category for life insurers as an important investor group. The analyses reveal that the current set-up and calibration of the Solvency II standard formula for market risk are inadequate with respect to the treatment of contingent convertible bonds. By highlighting these weaknesses of the market risk module, our results provide an indication for improving it.
